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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE IRISH ECONOMY: THE DEBATE LEADING UP TO THE ENACTMENT 
OF THE IRISH POOR LAW  IN 1838.1 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been suggested that social control lay at the core of classical political 
economy. Samuels (1992) argues that classical political economists were aware of 
the necessity of a docile workforce in ensuring economic development. Because of 
the importance they placed on laissez faire principles, classical political economists 
could not advocate the use of legislation to guarantee the level of security required to 
ensure the smooth transition from agricultural to industrial production. Instead, they 
placed emphasis on morals, religion and education; these were the only means 
whereby social control could be exercised and further industrial development 
facilitated (O’Brien 1975:272).  
 
Similarly, Boylan and Foley see the need for social control as lying behind classical 
political economy as it was applied to Ireland in the nineteenth century. However, 
they suggest that, in Ireland, social control was an end in itself for political economy, 
rather than as a means for further economic development. 
 
 Political economy was partisan, prescriptive, tendentious. Claiming to be non-
sectarian and non-political, it performed a vitally important ideological function 
for the political and religious establishment in defending existing socio-
economic relations, including landlordism, property rights and in attacking 
trade unions (1992:2). 
 
This paper challenges Boylan and Foley’s assertion by focusing on the debate 
leading up to the introduction of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act in 1838. The main 
participants in this debate were Nassau Senior, J.R.McCulloch, George Poulet 
Scrope and Robert Torrens in England. In Ireland, the main participant among 
political economists in the debate was Mountifort Longfield. Richard Whately was 
involved in the political debate through his appointment to the Commission for 
inquiring into the condition of the poor in Ireland in 1833. Isaac Butt also participated 
in the debate but since the significant part of his contribution was after the 
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establishment of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act in 1838, it falls out of the time period 
under consideration here. This research is based almost exclusively on primary 
sources, including publications and other papers of the aforementioned and other 
contemporaries that time has since rendered “minor,” as well as relevant 
parliamentary papers and select committee reports.  
 
This paper examines the arguments made by these leading contemporary political 
economists as to the causes of increasing pauperism in Ireland in the context of their 
analysis of the causes of the increasing pauperism also being experienced in 
England in the same period. This examination is based upon the premise that 
unexplained differences in their mode of analysis across the two countries might 
indicate evidence for Boylan and Foley’s argument. In addition, their analysis of the 
causes of Irish poverty is considered in the light of their subsequent policy 
prescriptions for dealing with this growing problem. This consideration is based upon 
the premise that a lack of internal logic between arguments over the causes of Irish 
poverty and policy prescriptions for its alleviation might also provide evidence for 
Boylan and Foley’s argument.     
 
The paper concludes that in the context of the poor relief debates, there is nothing to 
support the argument that political economy was used in order to protect the Irish 
establishment. The political economists reviewed here were certainly prescriptive, 
and political in the sense that they were concerned with the actions of government, 
but their arguments betray no trace of sectarianism. Far from defending the status 
quo, they were concerned with the future development of the Irish economy. It was 
this concern that directed their analysis of increasing Irish pauperism.  
 
II. 
THE NATURE OF POOR RELIEF 
The legislative arrangements made for the relief of the poor diverged markedly 
across the different countries of the British Isles. In England, a comprehensive 
system of rates existed by the early eighteenth century in order to provide funding for 
workhouses which were to provide relief to the aged and infirm poor (Innes 
1999:193). Providing for the poor in workhouses was called “indoor relief” to 
distinguish it from “outdoor relief”, namely,  the practice of providing support for the 
able-bodied poor by giving them employment on public works but no lodgings.  
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Rates were collected, and poor relief was administered, on a local parish basis. A 
less comprehensive version of this system also existed in Wales. The English Poor 
Law was overseen by a group of commissioners who in turn appointed regional 
assistant commissioners whose job it was to act as an inspectorate, gathering 
evidence on the numbers of poor and the provisions made for their relief in each 
parish. The bulk of this evidence was qualitative in nature, garnered from interviews 
with local magistrates, town clerks, police superintendents, church representatives 
and the like. Along with some limited data on numbers of poor in each parish, this 
evidence was presented to central government on annual basis. 
 
In Scotland, a well developed system of voluntary contributions collected and 
distributed through the ‘kirk-sessions,’ Presbyterian parish councils, had sustained 
indoor poor relief since the seventeeth century. Because poor relief was based upon 
voluntary contributions and administered by the church, there was not the same 
emphasis on reporting on the numbers of poor in Scottish parishes. However, as was 
the case with Ireland, select committees were periodically established to enumerate 
the extent of Scottish pauperism.  
 
Apart from differences in the nature of funding between Scotland, and England and 
Wales, there were also differences in entitlement to poor relief. In Scotland, only the 
aged and infirm were entitled to workhouse places. In England and Wales, however, 
indoor relief had been extended to cover the able-bodied poor under the Elizabethan 
Poor Law of 1795.  The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1795 also established more firmly 
than previous poor laws, the right of the poor to relief in England and Wales. Many 
parishes in all three countries provided outdoor relief whereby local overseers would 
be charged with the task of finding employment for the indigent of the parish. 
Employment could also be found through local Boards of Works who oversaw the 
building of roads and railways, drainage of land, and so on.2 In addition, local funding 
was forthcoming to assist with emigration and to purchase cheap food from abroad 
on an ad hoc basis when economic conditions necessitated. There were also 
localised, non-legislative schemes to increase labouring wages when they fell to a 
level below subsistence, known as “allowance” or “labour rate” schemes. These 
schemes were particularly prevalent in the Southern, agricultural counties of 
England.  
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After the Irish Act of Union in 1800, it was initially decided by government that the 
Scottish model of poor relief was most appropriate for Ireland, and consequently, no 
poor law was enacted (Innes 1999:194). It was widely believed at the time that the 
extension of provision of indoor relief to the able-bodied poor by the Elizabethan 
Poor Law had greatly increased pauperism in England and Wales, and that the much 
more restricted Scottish system, in contrast, explained what was perceived as the 
lower rate of pauperism there. It was decided that, for Ireland, a poor law would only 
exacerbate the pauperism problem as it had done in England. Thus, in Ireland,  the 
aged and infirm poor were to be supported through indoor relief financed by 
voluntary contributions on a parish by parish basis.  Some provision for the able-
bodied poor would be made through the borough corporations. These had been  
established in 1771 and had the power to establish “houses of industry” which aimed 
to provide work for the unemployed. By 1835 only nine houses of industry existed.3  
By far the biggest of these was the Dublin house of industry which, in 1835, had 
1,849 inhabitants. The provision these houses offered remained localised and 
limited.   
 
While charitable organisations, such as the Mendicancy Association in Dublin, 
managed to raise considerable funds, they tended to be located in urban areas 
where the numbers of poor were small in comparison to rural areas. Rural parishes, 
on the other hand, had great difficulty in raising the funds required to look after the 
significantly higher numbers of aged and infirm poor these parishes tended to have. 
Infirmaries, asylums, and fever hospitals also existed as places of refuge for the 
destitute, but , again, their capacity to alleviate the growing problem was severely 
limited.  
 
By the 1820s, it was becoming increasingly obvious that poor relief based upon 
voluntary contributions was inadequate to deal with the problem of  pauperism in 
Ireland. Despite the fact that there was no poor law in Ireland, various governmental 
committees supplied reports to Government on the state of the Irish poor from the 
late 1810s which pointed to the growing problem of vagrancy and destitution. Calls 
began to appear for the introduction of a more formalised system of poor relief for 
Ireland. 
 
The leading political economists of the time entered into a debate as to whether a 
rates system should be introduced to Ireland in order to finance a poor law, and if so, 
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how extensive such a poor law should be. The next section considers the main 
points of this debate. Their arguments in respect of Ireland were hugely influenced 
by what they believed to be the effect the right to poor relief granted by the poor laws 
had had on the rate of pauperism in England.  Thus, their arguments over poor relief 
for Ireland are analysed, not in isolation, but in the context of their experiences with 
poor relief in England.  
 
III 
CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF POOR RELIEF FOR IRELAND 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the rising rate of pauperism was a 
prominent issue across the British Isles. It was blamed for the increasing civil unrest 
in England throughout the 1820s and 1830s. McCulloch expressed a common 
concern that the unrest observed among labourers in the agricultural counties of the 
South of England would spread to the industrialised North: ‘would such a spirit to 
arise among the manufacturers of Lancashire as has recently prevailed in the 
southern counties, national bankruptcy and ruin would be the result…so mighty a 
mass cannot be dragooned and coerced into obedience’ (1831:62). Contemporary 
political economists debated the ways in which the problem of pauperism could be 
overcome, believing that once pauperism was under control, the threat of 
widespread civil unrest would recede and industrialisation would continue.  
 
From the middle of the eighteenth century, Ireland was viewed as being particularly 
subject to crime and disorder. As with England, this unrest was largely due to 
agrarian unrest. It ws felt that the problem in Ireland was more acute than in other 
parts of the British Isles and, for this reason, government established an armed 
police force for Ireland (Connolly, 1999:201). Contemporary English political 
economists were quick to point out the economic impact of such lawlessness on the 
development of the Irish economy. ‘The want of security, the unsettled state of the 
country, the dread of outrage and destruction to property, the secret combinations 
and nightly trainings of the peasantry’ (Scrope 1831: 529) had curtailed the flow of 
capital investment into the country. Scrope argued that Ireland was in a ‘vicious 
circle’ (1831:529). Without security, there would be no capital investment, and 
without capital investment, there would be no employment and therefore no security.4  
 
The mounting civil unrest had intensified the debate in both countries over what to do 
about increasing pauperism. The question considered here is whether political 
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economy was concerned with eliminating that civil unrest as a precursor to further 
economic development, as Samuels (1992) suggests, or whether, in the case of 
Ireland at least, it was used as a means of protecting the existing political and 
religious establishment, as suggested by Boylan and Foley. 
 
Causes of Increasing Pauperism in England and Ireland 
Several arguments were put forward to explain the rise in pauperism in England. The 
three principle causes suggested were: that Irish, and to a lesser extent, Scottish 
immigrants made up the vast portion of paupers in England; that the practice of 
consolidation of farms had destroyed a class of self-sufficient cottagers and turned 
them into vagrants; and finally, that the extensive poor relief offered to the able-
bodied poor under the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1795 had led to greater numbers of 
labourers choosing to accept poor relief rather than find employment.  While the first 
two explanations gathered support in the popular press, contemporary political 
economists argued that they were in fact consequences of the extension of poor 
relief to the able-bodied poor under Elizabethan Poor Law 1795.  
 
Contemporary political economists focused upon the extent to which the extensive 
indoor poor relief on offer had acted as a disincentive to labourers to seek 
employment. In 1828, McCulloch outlined what was a general consensus among 
political economists: 
 
 It is almost universally admitted that in their [the Poor Laws] practical 
operation, they tend to render the poor idle and improvident; that they teach 
them to depend on parish assistance, instead of trusting to their own 
exertions (1828:303). 
  
The generally accepted argument was as follows. Labourers should want to better 
themselves by adherring to the socially acceptable codes of conduct which included 
a strong work ethic and a desire to raise themselves above subsistence level. If this 
were the case, they would be willing to supply the labour required to expand the 
industrial base, as well as demanding the goods that the industrial base would 
produce. The labour productivity born out of a strong work ethic would stimulate 
further capital investment and ensure the continued expansion of industry.  
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Virtually all contemporary political economists argued that poor relief to the able-
bodied was in danger of preventing the further expansion of industry by creating an 
underclass of paupers who were not prepared to work when they could receive poor 
relief instead (for example, Ricardo 1973:134-35, 248; McCulloch 1828, 1829, 1831; 
Senior 1831; Scrope 1832a, 1832b, 1834; Longfield 1834). This decision to avail of 
poor relief rather than to work was referred to as indolence. In addition, it was 
generally believed that poor relief to the able-bodied poor encouraged them to 
increase the size of their families; since they could rely on poor relief, they did not 
have to worry about how to support their offspring. The conclusion was that this 
underclass of indolent paupers would only increase in size, thereby increasing the 
numbers who were dependent on rates.5 These conclusions were supported by the 
evidence supplied by annual Commissions and Select Committee reports into the 
extent of pauperism. 
 
Since Ireland had no poor law, it was obvious that the explanation for English 
pauperism would not fit the Irish circumstances. Initially, it was thought that Ireland 
might be displaying the Malthusian overpopulation effect. However, it is interesting to 
note that Malthus himself did not subscribe to that view. Having completed a tour of 
Westmeath, Kerry and Limerick in 1817, he wrote to Ricardo commenting that while 
the population seemed ‘greatly in excess above the demand for labour’, it was ‘not in 
general not much above the means of subsistence on account of the rapidity with 
which potatoes have increased under a system of cultivating them on very small 
properties’ (1817 (1952), vol.vii:174).  
 
Analysis of the causes of poverty in Ireland gathered momentum in 1828, when 
Sadler asserted that he had refuted the Malthusian overpopulation hypothesis for the 
case of Ireland using data from the 1821 census. He claimed that Ireland could not 
be considered overpopulated once she continued to export agricultural produce. If 
the Malthusian hypothesis held, he reasoned, then Ireland would not be able to feed 
its own inhabitants, never mind those of neighbouring countries. 
 
McCulloch (1829) questioned the validity of Sadler’s claim on several grounds 
although he agreed that Ireland was not overpopulated in the Malthusian sense. He 
disputed Sadler’s argument that Ireland’s export of agricultural produce was 
evidence that the country was not overpopulated. He countered that these exports 
reflected the desire of middle and upper classes for luxury items. Since these were 
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not manufactured in Ireland, they had to be imported in exchange for agricultural 
exports. Ireland was not, in McCulloch’s opinion, exporting a surplus agricultural 
production.  
 
By the time McCulloch’s retort to Sadler appeared, there was a developing 
consensus over the cause of Irish poverty – subtenantry. It is ironic that the very fact 
of subtenantry which Malthus held was preventing overpopulation in Ireland was put 
forward ten years later as the primary explanation for the increased pauperism and 
lack of development of the Irish economy. With regard to the English economy, 
McCulloch (1828) argued that the actions of landlords in preventing subtenantry was 
having a dampening effect on the rate of growth of the poor. He argued that any 
move towards creating a class of self-sufficient cottiers would simply fuel pauperism 
since at some stage these cottiers would find that they could no longer produce 
enough to keep themselves. He stressed that ‘nothing, indeed, has done more to 
multiply the number of paupers than the encouragement that has thus been held out 
to the improper increase of cottages’ (1831:59). He argued that it was no 
coincidence that the counties with the fewest paupers, ‘Durham, Northumberland 
and the Lothians,’ were also the counties with the largest farms (1831:60).  
 
For McCulloch, the cause of poverty in Ireland was solely due to the practice of 
subtenantry. He welcomed the Subletting Act of 1826 as a means of reversing the 
damage done to the productivity of Irish agriculture by breaking up land into smaller 
and smaller plots. He denied criticisms by Sadler that the Act was ‘an engine of 
oppression on the part of landlords’ (1829:312). He concluded that the policy should 
be stepped up and continued ‘until the land has been cleared of the superfluous 
tenants, and consolidated into farms capable of being properly managed’ 
(1829:313).    
 
While most contemporary political economists agreed with McCulloch’s analysis of 
the cause of Irish poverty, they did not share his sentiment that the Subletting Act 
had in fact been quite slow in clearing lands of cottiers. Senior argued that ‘almost all 
the evidence shows that the progress of clearing errs in being too rapid and too 
general’ (1831:32). Scrope argued that the lack of government response to the 
hardship caused by the Subletting Act underlined a stark contrast between how the 
Irish and the English poor were being treated. The English poor had recourse to both 
indoor and outdoor poor relief while Irish poor had to rely on sporadic and meagre 
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poor relief funded by voluntary contributions. Scrope argued that, given this unequal 
treatment, it was not surprising that Ireland was heading for insurrection. For Scrope, 
it was evident who was being protected. He argued that the government was using 
‘our law and our army to protect the Irish landlord in the exercise of his despotic 
power’ (1831:515). The Subletting Act, he held, ‘has given every landlord a ready 
and cheap power of ejecting his pauper tenantry from the hovel and the land, the 
occupation of which to them is a sine-qua-non of existence’ (1831:513). 
 
It had not been McCulloch’s intent that the increased pauperism generated from the 
Subletting Act not be dealt with. He acknowledged the necessity of a change of 
policy on the part of government towards poor relief in Ireland: 
 
 And hence, it is obvious, that the object of those who really wish to promote 
the prosperity of Ireland, ought to be to provide such an outlet for the poor, 
whether by emigration or otherwise, as would enable every landlord to set 
vigorously about clearing his estate the moment he has the opportunity 
(1829:314-5).  
 
He suggested that existing tenants be granted a legal claim to land they rented, in 
order to prevent a landlord from allowing ‘a parcel of mud huts to be erected on 
some neglected portion of his estate’ (1829:314). 
 
Despite this recommendation, it is clear that nearly ten years later, little had been 
done to alleviate the problem of pauperism arising out of the land clearances. In 
1838, Torrens described the ongoing practice as ‘inhuman…dangerous…and 
impracticable, unless adequate provision be made for the outgoing tenantry’ 
(1838:10-11). This would suggest that no significant steps had been taken in the 
intervening period to alleviate the increasing poverty that land clearances were 
generating.  
 
The political economists were in an awkward position. In respect of England, they 
were arguing that the Elizabethan Poor Law had resulted in increasing pauperism 
and indolence and should be restricted to only the aged and infirm. Yet, at the same 
time, the policy of land clearance in Ireland seemed to necessitate exactly that level 
of extensive poor relief which had been so disastrous for England, if social control 
was to be maintained and increasing productivity of Irish agriculture was to be 
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ensured. It was thought unlikely that industry would soak up the excess supply of 
labour created by the land clearances: Torrens felt that it would be ’long before her 
[Ireland’s] native manufacturers become so flourishing as to give employment to the 
hands no longer required upon the land’ (1838:10).  
 
It is obvious that the land clearances, however justified their long term effect, were 
causing severe political, social and economic problems in the short term. Scrope, 
once again taking an anti-landlord stance, pointed to the fact that England was 
bearing the cost of these problems: ‘we, simple fools, in Britain, are paying 
enormous taxes for an army to enable a handful of Irish landowners to grind to the 
earth the unfortunate denizens of their own soil’ (1831:545). The political 
consequences were, for Scrope, quite predictable. He argued that it was not 
surprising, given the government’s reluctance to provide poor relief, that ‘Mr 
O’Connell can make his unhappy land ring with the cry for the repeal of the Union’ 
(1831:545). Mountifort Longfield also advocated a poor law for Ireland on the 
grounds of security, despite an acknowledgement of the difficulties experienced with 
the English poor law: ‘the experience of England may inform us, that it is impossible 
to raise the pauper without depressing the labourer’ (1834:35).  
 
There was broad consensus among the English political economists that while in 
England being poor was the fault of the poor themselves, in Ireland poverty was due 
to landlords’ tolerance towards the practice of subtenantry. However, there was no 
such consensus over how to deal with the growing numbers of  paupers generated 
by the Subletting Act. Four main issues were discussed in this context: the provision 
of indoor poor relief, emigration, the provision of outdoor poor relief, and funding for 
poor relief.  
 
The Legal Provision of Indoor Poor Relief in England and Ireland 
Despite the growing problem of pauperism in Ireland throughout the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, some commentators were consistent in their argument 
against a poor law for the able-bodied in both England and Ireland. Ricardo 
recommended the removal of poor relief for the able-bodied in both countries. In 
respect of England, he argued that ‘everything would go on well if we could rescue 
the lowest labourers with families from a habitual reliance on the rates. By doing so, 
we should better the condition of all above that class’ (Ricardo, (1817)1952, vol.vii: 
134-5). Ricardo acknowledged that, in certain circumstances, poor relief might be 
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necessary. However, he held that such poor relief should be financed by the poor 
themselves. He proposed a system of enforced savings upon the labouring classes 
in order to ‘provide for those casualities to which they are exposed from occasional 
variations in the demand for particular manufactured goods’ ((1818)1952, vol.vii: 
248). An enforced savings scheme assumed that the labouring class operated in a 
monetised labour market. This was not the case for most of Ireland.  
 
Ricardo argued that an extensive poor law for Ireland would lead to the widespread 
choice of leisure over labour. The central problem for Ireland was the ‘indolence and 
vice of the people, and not…their inability to procure necessaries’ ( (1816) 1952, 
vol.ii:48). Thus, Ricardo reasoned that poverty in Ireland had been generated by the 
poor themselves, as it had been in England.  
 
Senior, while acknowledging that the root of pauperism in Ireland was very different 
from that of England, also held that a poor law which extended relief to the able-
bodied poor would only result in the same problems that the Elizabethan Poor Law 
had produced in England. He felt that the Irish were particularly prone to indolence. It 
is important to note that only Senior and Ricardo drew distinctions between the Irish 
and the English labourer in this way. Scrope went so far as to reverse the argument  
by asserting that ‘neither Englishman or Scotchman will surpass the Irishman in 
close and patient toil, frugality, and providence’ (1831:523). Wrightson, drawing on 
his experience as a Commissioner in respect of investigating the extent of poverty in 
Ireland, also argued that the Irish did not suffer from the indolence of the English: 
 
 Her people, low as their condition is , are in no such perverted and unnatural 
position. Much as they may have suffered at the hands of statesmen and 
magistrates, they have happily never been brought up to depend on any 
bread but that of industry. They are ready to go all distances in search of 
employment, and undertake any work, however alien from their habits 
(1837:190).   
   
Senior insisted that ‘the experiment in England has produced a state of things which, 
if not immediately remedied, threatens the destruction of society’ (1831:28). He was 
convinced that Ireland would suffer the same fate if a legal right to poor relief for the 
able-bodied poor was established. Yet, when asked to participate in the drawing up 
of a new poor law for England, Senior proposed that indoor poor relief should 
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continue to be provided. On the face of it, there was a glaring inconsistency between 
Senior’s poor relief recommendations for England, and those he favoured for Ireland.  
 
How could Senior argue that workhouses were appropriate for English, but not for 
Irish, paupers? It had been argued that the workhouse system in England could only 
be depended upon not to increase indolenace if the level of subsistence offered in 
them was far below the level of subsistence labourers could expect to get from 
employment. This argument was formalised in the “workhouse test,” extensively 
proposed by George Nicholls who assisted in the drafting of the English New Poor 
Law of 1834, the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act of 1838, and various poor laws for Belgium 
and the Netherlands. The problem in applying the workhouse test to Ireland was that 
the level of  subsistence afforded from labouring wages was so low (if indeed, 
employment could be found at all), that it would have been impossible for 
workhouses to undercut it. No matter what level of subsistence workhouses offered, 
it was unlikely that they could undercut the level of subsistence among the labouring 
poor. Following this logic, Senior argued that there was no way of preventing an 
extensive workhouse system from increasing indolence in Ireland.   
 
It was not the case that contemporary political economists were all agreed that a 
Poor Law was inappropriate for Ireland. While most had reservations based upon 
their experiences with the English Poor Law, they conceded that Irish poverty was of 
a different character and therefore warranted an alternative solution. By 1831, 
Scrope stressed that all commentators, with the glaring exception of Senior, were in 
agreement that rates-funded poor relief had to be introduced to Ireland on a large 
scale: ‘[McCulloch] has, since that time, together with many others – we believe we 
may say all the political economists – wholly reversed that opinion’ that poor relief 
would generate more poverty in Ireland (1831:517).   
 
In 1834, in Ireland, Mountifort Longfield supported a poor law and called for the 
application of the workhouse test in the provision of indoor poor relief. This was in 
spite of the fact that it had been conceded by Senior and others that the level of 
subsistence in Ireland was so low that it would be very difficult for any workhouses to 
undercut it. In general, Longfield’s discussion seems oddly incongruous with the Irish 
situation. For example, he wrote extensively on the evils of the allowance schemes. 
This was a moot argument in respect of Ireland, since such schemes did not operate 
there and were unlikely to be introduced. It is evident from Longfield’s four lectures 
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on poor relief, that his main concern was the mounting civil unrest in Ireland. His 
analysis of the Irish situation seems to have been muddied by his fears in this 
regard. 
  
By the beginning of the 1830s, there was considerable support for the introduction of 
poor relief in Ireland by contemporary political economists. However, it was generally 
conceded that pauperism in Ireland was so extensive that the provision of indoor 
poor relief alone could combat it. Other means of dealing with Irish pauperism were 
considered, principally emigration and outdoor poor relief.  
 
Emigration6 
Nearly all contemporary English political economists argued that recourse to 
emigration would ease the situation in Ireland. The obvious destination for Irish 
paupers was the closest one – England. This was not a popular choice in England. 
The popular belief in England was that Irish paupers were flowing into England, 
availing of poor relief and taking jobs from English labourers.7 These sentiments 
were supported by the minutes of evidence gathered as part of annual Select 
Committee and Commission reports on the English Poor Law. In 1828, the report 
from the Select Committee on that part of the poor laws relating to the employment 
or relief of able bodied persons from the poor rate put the causes of increased 
poverty and unemployment as being principally the existence of allowance schemes, 
but it also cited minutes of evidence from vestry and parish clerks in various parishes 
who pointed to how Irish immigrants arrived in great numbers to parishes such as 
Liverpool. However, the minutes of evidence also report that Irish immigrants rarely 
stayed long: ‘we often return them immediately; we have daily means of sending 
them across the water’ (1828:59). They were given some bread and returned to 
Ireland on the next sailing.  
 
In the same year, the report from the Select Committee on Irish and Scottish 
Vagrants gave estimates of the numbers of immigrants: ‘the numbers passed 
through the county of Lancaster, amounted in the last five years, to 22,045, of which, 
20,414 were Irish, and 1,631 Scotch’ (1828:4). J.A. Powell, town clerk of Liverpool, 
reported that many of the Irish were ‘professionally beggars (sic)’ who would come to 
him for postal orders to send money back to Ireland year after year (1828:9). He 
argued that in his opinion the reported number of Irish immigrants to Lancaster was 
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exagerated as the estimates “double-counted” immigrants who came to the county 
from Ireland twice or three times a year.  
 
Despite the lack of reliable data on the numbers of Irish immigrants, calls were made 
in certain quarters for a restriction on the freedom of movement between Ireland and 
England. Senior was ‘inexpressibly disgusted at the wish to deprive the Irish labourer 
of his resort to England’ (1831:50). His disgust was on both economic and political 
grounds. He talked about the ‘improvements in habits, tastes and feelings, 
introduced by those who have visited England’ (1831: 50); this would instill a desire 
to improve their standard of living, encouraging a stronger work ethic among the Irish 
labouring class.  He also argued that if there was an excess demand for labour in 
particular counties in England, there would be an inflow of labour from somewhere 
else, be it Ireland or not. This inflow would have the same impact on wages, he 
asserted, regardless of its origins. Finally he asked: 
 
Can the Union have more effective enemies than those who would consider 
Great Britain and Ireland as one country when we are to gain by it, and two 
when we fancy that we are to lose (1831:51). 
      
McCulloch believed that Irish immigration was a serious problem for England: 'Great 
Britain has been overrun by half-famished horders, that have, by their competition, 
lessened the wages of labour, and by their example, degraded the habits and 
lowered the opinions of the people with respect to subsistence’ (1828:327). Irish 
immigration was fueling the already growing indolence of English paupers. Both 
Scrope and McCulloch argued that one of the benefits of an Irish poor law would be 
a reduction in the numbers of Irish paupers coming to England to look for work.  
 
Senior countered that Irish immigration was not damaging the English labour market. 
Once the Irish labourer was not paid above his productivity, ‘he must increase 
instead of diminishing the general fund for the payment of wages’ (1831:47). He 
argued that, in addition, most Irish workers were seasonal workers in the agricultural 
counties, and, they tended to ‘perform the laborious and most disagreeable services’ 
(1831:47). Irish labourers were meeting a demand for labour that would not be met 
by English labourers. The solution to Irish immigration, for Senior, was not the legal 
provision of poor relief in Ireland, but rather the removal of this provision in England. 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 43 
15 
This would reduce indolence among English paupers and they would compete more 
effectively with Irish immigrants for employment.  
 
Not surprisingly, proposals of emigration schemes to the colonies of Canada and 
Australia did not generate the same political problems as emigration to England. In 
general, McCulloch saw emigration as being ‘advantageous to all classes, by drying 
up the most copious source of internal commotion’ (1831:53). While he conceded 
that no one should be forced to emigrate, he did advise that parishes should reduce 
inducements to the poor to stay. He used the same argument in favour of emigration 
from Ireland.  
 
In 1838, Torrens published a report which proposed the construction of an 
emigration fund for Ireland through the establishment of a joint stock company. He 
argued that ‘the expense of locating the able-bodied poor in the Colonies would be 
less than that of maintaining them at home’ (1838:13). The company would purchase 
land, principally in Australia, and emigrants would get free passage and two acres at 
a rent of 5s per acre rent for 21 years, as well as a ‘guarantee that they shall 
employment upon the public works at 1s per day’ (1838:24). In comparison to 
supplying workhouse places for the Irish poor, this seemed a cost effective way of 
dealing with the problem. McCulloch had long since disposed of the argument that it 
would be inhumane to force the impoverished to leave their homes: 
 
 When the non-employment, squalid poverty, and wretchedness of the Irish 
poor are universally admitted, it is really farcical to talk of the ‘cruelty’ and 
‘atrocity’ of encouraging their emigration to Canada or the United States; 
countries where labour is in great demand (1829:311) 
 
There was a general consensus among leading commentators that emigration to the 
colonies was an effective safety valve for eliminating excess labour across the British 
Isles. Interestingly, however, emigration schemes were not proposed as a major 
feature of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act in 1838 on the somewhat dubious grounds 
that these schemes would precipitate a brain drain. 
 
The Provision of Outdoor Poor Relief 
Outdoor poor relief under the English Poor Law involved the provision of employment 
or “parish work” for the unemployed. Overseers were appointed in each parish, 
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whose responsibility it was to find work locally for the unemployed. This usually 
involved persuading landlords and large farmers to hire more labourers. Wages for 
such work were paid out of parish rates. In some parishes, where wages fell below 
subsistence level, labourer’s wages would be added to from poor relief funds. The 
additional wage was determined by the number of dependents each labourer had. 
This process of topping up labouring wages when required was known as the labour 
rate or allowance scheme. This scheme also fell under the heading of outdoor poor 
relief.   
 
There were problems with outdoor poor relief. Not surprisingly, the system was seen 
by many landlords as a means of subsidising their labour costs. Scrope argued that, 
under parish work, the unemployed were only ‘nominally set to work’ (1832:322). 
McCulloch (1828) had criticised, in addition, the practice whereby unemployed 
labourers were rounded into gangs and moved from parish to parish as work 
became available. Since these “roundsmen” were working for subsistence, they 
squeezed ‘regular labourers’ (1831:48) out of the market and reduced the average 
labouring wage. McCulloch concluded that ‘labour is a commodity; and, as such, an 
article of commerce, and ought to be left, like everything else, to find its own fair 
value in the market’ (1831: 51).  Wrightson went so far as to describe the labour 
market operating in England as ‘totally deranged’ (1837:189), as a result of the 
distortions the outdoor poor relief created.  
 
Nearly all commentators argued against the permitted continuation of the labour rate 
or allowance schemes. McCulloch argued that they had been ‘productive of an 
extent of mischief that could hardly have been conceived possible’ (1828: 319). They 
acted as ‘premium on idleness and profligacy’ (1828:320), and encouraged farmers 
to pay less for labour: ‘the farmers are led to encourage a system which fraudulently 
imposed a heavy burden upon others’ (1828:322). Likewise, Scrope saw the 
allowance scheme as ‘an illegal and fraudulent device of the larger farmers, for 
shifting a portion of the necessary wages of their labourers in the small farmers who 
hire little or no labour, the tradesmen, householders, and clergymen of the Parish’ 
(1832:324). He argued that the scheme made it impossible to measure the extent of 
‘surplus labour existing in any parish’ (1832:324). The removal of the allowance 
schemes was recommended by several Commissions, most notably, the Select 
Committee on that part of the poor laws relating to the employment or relief of able 
bodied persons from the poor rate (1828).  
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It was widely believed that the provision of outdoor poor relief in Ireland would also 
result in the generation of “ficticious” employment for surplus labour. Senior (1831) 
argued that any rates would quickly run out if it was spent on outdoor poor relief 
since the work generated offered no real return. Scrope countered that if rates were 
spent on public works, it would lead to greater private capital investment and would 
‘repay fourfold the expenses of cultivation’ (1831:527).  Not all the funding had to 
come from rates. Once large scale investment was begun, funding for public works 
could come in part from stock markets such as London, Paris, Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, all of which, he held, were ‘glutted’ with funds for investment (1831:533). 
He pointed to the positive impact public works had had on Scottish labourers in the 
1810s when agricultural regions faced famines and manufacturing went into a 
decline.    
 
In part, Senior did agree with Scrope that public works were required if the Irish 
economy was to develop but he held that these were ‘measures of slow operation’ 
(1831:20) and that in the meantime, poverty would persist. Despite this, he persisted 
in his argument that any indoor poor relief would simply make matters worse.8  
However, by this stage, Senior was very much in the minority among political 
economists in his poor relief recommendations for Ireland. For the vast majority of 
commentators, there was no question that some form of poor relief had to be 
extended to Ireland; the issue was who should pay. If political economy was being 
used to protect the Irish establishment in this regard, one would imagine that policy 
recommendations would invoke schemes designed to minimise the cost to the Irish 
establishment. 
 
The Funding of Irish Poor Relief 
While Senior did not approve of a rates-funded poor law for Ireland, he did not 
oppose the introduction of a system of poor relief funded by voluntary contributions 
along Scottish lines: ‘I anxiously wish to prevent the existence in Ireland, not of a 
legal provision for charitable purposes, but of a legal provision for the able-bodied 
poor’ (1831:44). Senior pointed, not to any responsibility on the part of landlords to 
their tenants, but to the fact that the Scottish system restricted poor relief to the aged 
and infirm. He viewed the Scottish system as ‘nearly perfect’ (1831:28).  
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The role of the Prebyterian Church in the successful operation of poor relief in 
Scotland was widely acknowledged. It is perhaps partly the reason behind Ricardo’s 
argument that the Catholic Church in Ireland become part of the establishment: 
 
 Surely no reasonable man can apprehend danger to the United Kingdom 
from according the catholic claims in Ireland – I believe that the church 
establishment in Ireland would be more secure, but I should not see much to 
regret if Ireland had a catholic establishment, in the same way as Scotland 
has a presbyterian one ((1821) 1952, vol.viii:350-51). 
 
Writing on the contentious issue of church tithes in 1831, Senior expressed his 
support for a government provision for the Catholic Church in Ireland: ‘as an act of 
justice to the Catholic population…I am most anxious to see a public provision made 
for the Catholic clergy’ (1831:68). Torrens, too, despite being an Irish landowning 
Protestant, lent ‘valiant support’ to the cause of Catholic emancipation (Spiegal, 
1992:347). John Bicheno, a political economist who was appointed to the 
Commission for inquiring into the condition of the poor in Ireland during the 
preparation of its second report in 1835, also favoured the strengthening of the 
Catholic Church. He acknowledged the ‘inconvenience experienced from the political 
character of the priests’ (1830:194), but argued that they were well aware that 
widespread civil unrest would not further the case of Catholic emancipation. For that 
reason, Bicheno held that ‘they are, on the contrary, the best check that exists to 
moderate the wild career of ignorance and passion’ (1830:195).   
 
This support for the Catholic Church does not sit easily with Boylan and Foley’s 
contention that political economy was sectarian.9 On the contrary, there is no 
evidence of an anti-Catholic bias on the part of any of the English political 
economists considered here. Indeed, most seemed to accept that a better funded 
Catholic Church could aid in the process of education that they held to be vital to the 
development of a sustainable economy.10 Bicheno pointed to the remarkable level of 
funding which the Catholic Church managed to raise ‘considering the drainage that is 
constantly going on by the landlords, and that there is another church to be 
supported with a prodigal allowance’ (1830:176). A formally established Catholic 
Church could have been expected to fund a significant amount of poor relief. 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 43 
19 
Boylan and Foley seem to suggest that sectarianism and a desire to preserve the 
Protestant Establishment went hand in hand. In fact, many of those who supported 
Catholic emancipation also favoured the continuance of the Union. This was true of 
Catholics as well as Protestants, most notably, Dr. James Doyle, Bishop of Kildare 
and Leighlin, who worked with McCulloch on the Select Committee for the Inquiry 
into the Poor in Ireland (1830). Nor were landlordism and support for Catholic 
emancipation mutually exclusive; O’Connell provides a salient example of this.   
  
For those commentators who advocated  a Poor Law, the question as to who should 
pay was easily answered. In his evidence to the  Select Committee for the Inquiry 
into the Poor in Ireland (1830), McCulloch proposed a rates-funded poor law for 
Ireland along the lines of the existing English legislation. He had previously stated his 
change of mind over the issue of Irish poor relief. He ackowledged that this 
contradicted his earlier stance that such extensive poor relief would lead to greater 
poverty and indolence. He had previously justified his change of mind by arguing that 
‘the experience of England has proved, that the efforts of the landlords, and of the 
wealthier classes of the community, to keep down the rates, more than 
counterbalances these tendencies’ (1829:314). He argued that if landlords were 
forced to pay out rates to finance poor relief, there would be an incentive for them to 
reduce the amount of rates they had to pay by investing in their lands and generating 
employment.   
 
It was also held by some that landlords should foot the bill for emigration. Bicheno 
stressed that ‘the only guarantee England can have against the repetition of the evil 
[subtenantry], is to make the land itself bear the expenses of the transportation’ 
(1830:274). If emigration were to continue to be funded by government rather than 
by rates, there would be no disincentive to landlords to prevent subtenantry and a 
subsequent rise in pauperism at some stage in the future.  
 
Scrope reviewed the proposed plans for Irish poor relief, and noted that ‘in all the 
plans that have been proposed for applying a poor-rate to Ireland, it has been 
thought right to throw a considerable portion of its burden on the landowner’ 
(1831:531). Scrope felt that this was appropriate since ‘the Irish landowners do not 
spontaneously invest the surplus of their incomes in the mode which would be so 
beneficial both to themselves and their country’ (1831:532). He also argued that a 
rates-funded poor law would force absentee landlords back to Ireland, ‘threatened on 
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the one hand by the assessment of their property and induced on the other by the 
improved system of society at home’ (1831:533). 
 
Scrope, McCulloch and Bicheno were critical of the Irish absentee landlords, but not 
because of their absenteeism per se. Bicheno pointed out that Ireland was not the 
only country where absenteeism could be found. It was rife in France, Germany and 
Italy, too, yet the same problem of widespread destitution did not exist there to the 
same extent (1830:104). Bicheno put this down to what he saw as the unique 
relationship between landlord and tenant which existed in Ireland. 
 
 In Ireland, any kindness which is shewn to the tenantry, depends upon the 
generosity of the individual, and not upon any general feeling which prevails 
among the class. There are many liberal landlords in the country; but still, as 
a class, they are needy, exacting, unremitting, harsh, and without sympathy 
for their tenants (1830:123) 
  
Bicheno contrasted this to the situation in England, where ‘kindnesses’ were 
‘expected by the tenant, on an understanding, hardly amounting to a right, yet not far 
short of it’ (1830:122). Both Bicheno and Scrope had a paternalistic view of the role 
of the landlord in ensuring social stability. They argued strenuously that Irish 
landlords had renaged in their duties and should now be forced to pay for the 
alleviation of Irish poverty.  
 
McCulloch, in contrast, did not point to any particular moral obligation on the part of 
Irish landlords. He was particularly concerned with the popular argument that 
absentee landlords were a major source of Ireland’s failure to develop. He argued 
that a return to Ireland by absentee landlords would not reduce agricultural exports. 
They would still demand English-produced luxury goods regardless of where they 
resided, and would have to export agricultural produce to England in order to pay for 
these goods. Bicheno argued in a more general sense that ‘whatever would induce 
the gentry to reside on their estates, would obviously be productive of great good’ 
(1830:168). However, he also pointed out that residence in Ireland would encourage 
landlords to invest in their lands. Scrope, too, criticised Irish landlords for failing to 
engage in capital expenditure. He complained of Irish landlords preferring instead to 
invest in ‘English funds’ (1831:532).  
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Both McCulloch and Scrope argued that a poor rate would force landlords to invest in 
their lands in order to reduce the rates burden; Scrope believed that this would be all 
the more likely if Irish landlords were resident on their estates. All the main 
commentators who favoured poor relief for Ireland proposed that the lions share of 
the burden should fall on Irish landlords. It is difficult to justify Boylan and Foley’s 
argument that political economy was being used to further the cause of landlords in 
Ireland, at least in the context of this debate. 
  
It is clear from this review of the main English contributors to the debate over poor 
relief for Ireland that their central concern was the further development of the Irish 
economy. Even those who opposed a poor law for Ireland did so in the belief that 
such a law would simply increase the problem of pauperism and indolence and slow 
down the rate of progress of the economy, as they believed it had done in England. 
By 1830, all political economists, with the sole exception of Senior, advocated rates-
funded poor relief for Ireland. There were several reasons for this recommendation. 
It cannot be ignored that McCulloch and Scrope believed that a poor law in Ireland 
would stem the flow of paupers from Ireland to England and ease the situation there.  
However, their arguments in favour of a poor law for Ireland were predominantly set 
in the context of economic development in Ireland. Torrens and McCulloch, in 
particular, stressed the importance of continuing the pace of land clearance if Irish 
agriculture was to develop.  This policy could only be continued without insurrection if 
poor relief was made readily available. Scrope pointed to the fact that poor relief 
would do much to ensure stability in the country and could be expected to prompt 
increased capital expenditure.  There is little evidence of Boylan and Foley’s 
assertions in respect of the leading  political economists who participated in the 
debate on poor relief for Ireland. However, it would appear that they were to have 
little influence on the content of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act. Indeed, despite the 
numbers of contributors to the Irish poor relief debate in the previous decade, the Act 
was largely the work of a single man, George Nicholls.  
 
IV. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POOR LAW FOR IRELAND  
On 25th September,1833, a Commission for inquiring into the condition of the poor in 
Ireland was established.11  The Commission’s first report did not appear until 1835, a 
delay which was seen by many commentators as unacceptable given the severity of 
the situation. Assistant Commissioners had been appointed to collect evidence on a 
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parish by parish basis, supplemented by a questionnaire which was sent to ‘the 
clergy of each persuasion, to the Magistry, to the heads of the Police, and to such 
educated persons as had been named as able and willing to give us assistance’ 
(1835:viii). The aim of the first report was to give estimates of the numbers of 
paupers based upon minutes of evidence supplied by the above as well as data from 
the 1831 census, but the Commissioners stressed their desire to go beyond this 
narrow brief. They wanted not only to propose schemes to cope with the increasing 
numbers of poor, but also to ‘prevent the existence of destitution’ altogether 
(1835:xii).  
 
The Commissioners presented two further reports in quick succession.12 The second 
report deals with the institutions already existing for poor relief, principally the houses 
of industry. The third report estimated the number of agricultural labourers in Ireland 
to be 1,131,715, compared to 1,055,982 in England (1836:3). In addition, ‘the 
cultivated land of Great Britain amounts to about 34,250,000 acres and that of 
Ireland only to about 14,600,000’ (1836:3). This produced an excess supply of 
agricultural labour in Ireland which forced the average wage down. The average 
wage in Ireland was ‘2s to 2s 6d a-week or thereabouts’ compared to the average 
wage in England of ‘from 8s to 10s a-week’ (1836:4). The Commission reasoned that 
Irish wages could not rise to the English level unless the productivity of Irish 
agricultural labour rose, but that given the relative shortage of land in Ireland, this 
was not likely to happen. They estimated that there were 585,000 unemployed 
people in Ireland.13 If one added to this figure the numbers dependent upon the 
unemployed, the total figure estimated by the Commissioners of paupers in Ireland 
came to 2,385,000. The Commissioners put the cost of supplying indoor poor relief 
to cater for these numbers at £5,000,000. The Commissioners argued that, given the 
numbers that would have to be catered for,  indoor poor relief would be too 
expensive. They estimated landlords’ net income to be £6,000,000. If landlords were 
to pay rates to the amount required, this would leave them nothing to reinvest in their 
lands. 
 
The Commissioners held that, in any case, Irish paupers would refuse to remain in 
workhouses whatever the consequences: ‘our conviction is that the able-bodied in 
general, and their families, would endure any misery rather than make a workhouse 
their domicile’ (1836:5). The Commissioners also argued against the provision of 
‘out-door compulsory employment… considering the number of persons for whom 
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work must be found’ (1836:5). They argued that forcing farmers to employ 
unemployed labourers would ‘reduce the wages of all to a minimum’ (1836:6).  
 
The Commissioners had no such problem with the provision of employment on public 
works and recommended that extensive public works be established, for the same 
reasons that Scrope (1831) had advocated. They pointed to the importance of the 
development of infrastructure, in particular land reclamation and drainage systems,14 
and argued that the remit of the Board of Works be greatly extended. This 
programme of public works would take care of the demand side of the labour market, 
but what of the supply side?  
 
The Commissioners argued that while subtenantry existed, labouring wages were 
viewed as an additional means to increase subsistence. However, land clearances 
meant that the labouring wage had become the main source of subsistence for 
labourers. Hence, the Commission argued that the labouring wage had to be 
increased. The main innovation in the reports of the Commissioners was their 
proposal that the average wage in Ireland be increased to 4s 6d per week. This 
would increase the wage bill for landlords, but the Commissioners argued that 
landlords alone should have to pay. If labour was more expensive, landlords would 
be forced to engage in capital investment to make that labour more productive.   
 
 
It is unlikely that many political economists would have supported such interference 
in the Irish labour market. There was little commentary on the Commission’s 
proposals among political economists. It seems that the report of the Commission 
was also ignored by government: ‘it would appear from the discussion in Parliament, 
as well as from the publications of Mr George Lewis and others, that this document 
has entirely escaped observation’ (Wrightson 1837:201).  
 
The poor relief proposals of the Commission were turned down by the Chief 
Secretary for Ireland, Lord John Russell. One might speculate that the main reason 
for this rejection was the expense of the schemes proposed. After the presentation 
of the first report of the Commissioners to Parliament, Russell enlisted George 
Nicholls, the English Poor Law Commissioner, to investigate the possibility of a 
‘practical solution’ for poor relief in Ireland (1836). Nicholl’s brief was essentially to 
come up with a cheap solution which would have an immediate and highly visible 
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impact of pauperism in Ireland. He reported back to Lord Russell making ample use 
of the minutes of evidence and the estimates provided by the Commission’s three 
reports, as well as drawing on his own impressions following an eight week tour of 
the country in 1836. Nicholls accepted the estimate of 2,385,000 paupers calculated 
by the Commission. Yet, he proposed a workhouse scheme which would supply 
indoor poor relief for 80,000 aged, infirm and able bodied poor. Isaac Butt’s 
sentiments, in a letter to Lord Viscount Morpeth, HM principal secretary of state for 
Ireland (1837), reflected the reaction of many commentators, when he wrote: ‘the 
people of Ireland have not food enough to eat…here is the evil, and you take 80,000 
of the people and you shut them up in workhouses’ (1837:19).   
   
One might have expected Nicholls to propose emigration as a means of making the 
substantial shortfall. However, he argued that emigration should in fact be a last 
resort as it would generate a brain drain: ‘a continual draft of its best elements lowers 
the tone and reduces the general vigour of the community’ (1837:56). This is a 
somewhat moot  argument, given that emigrants were overwhelmingly from the 
labouring classes (Mokyr and O’Grada, 1982).15 He did suggest that land drainage 
and reclamation might be engaged in but it is not clear who he envisaged should pay 
for these schemes.  
 
Nicholls did accept that the workhouse test could not be applied to workhouses in 
Ireland: ‘the standard of their mode of living is unhappily so low, that the 
establishment of one still lower is difficult, and would, I think, under any 
circumstances be inexpedient’ (1836:24). However, he justified the building of 
workhouses that offered a level of subsistence in line with that gained from 
employment on the grounds that the Irish ‘have never been enervated by a 
dependence upon a misapplied system of parish relief’ (1836:25). Workhouses 
would not cause indolence in Ireland because of the nature of the Irish. Yet, Nicholls 
went on to contradict himself by blaming the rising pauperism on the ‘indiscriminate 
alms-giving’ of the existing houses of industry (1836:11). In essence, Nicholls 
confused the causes of English and Irish poverty and attempted to come up with one 
policy for both countries.   
 
Several political economists acknowledged the gross inadequacy of Nicholl’s 
analysis of Irish poverty and his proposals for its alleviation, most notably Torrens. 
Torren’s 1838 letter to Lord Russell pointed not only to the limited usefulness of 
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Nicholl’s proposal in dealing with existing paupers, but also estimated that if 
workhouses were the only palliative offered, the numbers of paupers could be 
expected to rise to over 5 million in just a few years (1838:55). Butt was incensed by 
the limited scope of Nicholl’s proposals, given the numbers of paupers reported by 
Whately’s Commission: ‘it is difficult, my lord, to suppress a feeling of astonishment 
that any ministry should have based a legislative measure on such a document as 
this report of Mr Nicholl’s’ (1837:22).    
 
Despite the negative views of contemporary political economists on Nicholls’ 
proposals, they were to form the basis for the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act of 1838. In 
September 1838, Nicholls moved to Blackrock in Co. Dublin to supervise the 
implementation of the early stages of the Act. This proved more difficult than had 
been anticipated by Nicholls due to continuing opposition to the Act in and out of 
Parliament. He remained in Ireland until November 1842. 
 
O’Grada (1993:126) holds the view that ‘the impact of economists on public opinion 
and on economic policy, through their parliamentary spokesmen and the media, was 
certainly against government intervention in Ireland’ as a means of alleviating 
poverty in Ireland. While the policy outcome was a relatively benign one of limited 
rates-funded poor relief and could be described as involving minimal government 
intervention, this can hardly be said to be as a result of the influence of the majority 
of commentators on the Irish situation who were in fact arguing in favour of extensive 
government intervention.    
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a marked consensus over the cause of Irish pauperism among the 
political economists who participated in the poor relief for Ireland debate up to the 
enactment of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act in 1838. The practice of subtenantry had 
encouraged the development of a self-sufficient cottier class, had diminished returns 
to agricultural investment, and had stunted the development of a monetised labour 
market. Thus, when famines occurred, there was no alternative means of support 
open to the cottier class and they became destitute. Increasing pauperism was 
already causing widespread agrarian unrest, and this would severely limit the interest 
in capital investment in Ireland. The solution was quite simple: reduce the number of 
tenants and consolidate farms.  
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It was clear to all commentators that this policy would produce untold hardship for 
the Irish labouring classes. Initially, leading figures such as Senior and McCulloch 
drew on their perceptions of the damage that the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1795 had 
done in England and recommended that no rates-funded poor relief be introduced 
into Ireland. However, by the beginning of the 1830s, it was generally conceded that 
the nature of Irish poverty differed substantially from that seen in England. This 
prompted the vast majority of commentators to recommend some form of poor relief 
for Ireland. In general, indoor poor relief was seen as an inappropriate response 
given the numbers of destitute. No system of workhouses could cater for the volume 
of paupers.  Contemporary political economists emphasised that any system of 
indoor poor relief would have to supplemented by other forms of relief. They 
emphasised the importance of public works in alleviating poverty in the short term 
and in ensuring the development of the Irish economy in the longer term. Emigration 
was also considered as a method of reducing the excess supply of labour in the 
country.  
 
Senior outlined a vision shared by political economists of the scope of development 
of the Irish economy once land clearances had achieved their goal: 
 
 The extension of farms, and the consequent conversion of cottiers into hired 
labourers; the opening up of roads and canals, and, in time, it may be hoped, 
of rail-roads, events which, from the testimony of almost all the witnesses, 
are rapidly taking place, and which may be assisted by Government, if money 
is advanced for public works and to facilitate by emigration the consolidation 
of farms, will prevent the evils which arise from a bad agricultural system, and 
imperfect means of communication (1831:20). 
 
Boylan and Foley imply that the development of the Irish economy was not part of 
the agenda of political economy as it was applied to Ireland in the nineteenth 
century. Robbins, on the other hand, has argued ‘that the classical economists were 
concerned with growth, and that their concern was especially orientated on the 
possible effects of growth in redeeming the conditions of the majority of the people 
stands out in any just appraisal’ (1976:102). The evidence with respect to the debate 
on poor relief for Ireland in the early nineteenth century would certainly favour 
Robbins' interpretation over that of Boylan and Foley.   
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Boylan and Foley argue that political economy was used as an ideological tool in the 
nineteenth century. This would suggest a discipline that was highly cohesive. 
However, in the context of the debate considered here, while there was a significant 
degree of consensus over the nature of Irish poverty, this consensus evolved over 
the early decades of the nineteenth century through debate and the inspection of 
empirical evidence as it became available. This developmental nature of the 
arguments with regard to the poor relief issue suggests that it would not have had 
the cohesiveness required for an effective ideological tool.  
 
Boylan and Foley suggest that political economy supported the Irish Protestant 
establishment and level the charge of landlordism. On the contrary, contemporary 
commentators blamed landlords for the growing poverty in Ireland. Among those 
who advocated poor relief for Ireland there was no suggestion that landlords should 
not have to pay. Implicit in Boylan and Foley’s assertions is the notion that political 
economy was sectarian. The evidence shows the opposite to be true. The political 
economists involved in this debate favoured the establishment of the Catholic church 
on the grounds that it could aid in reinstating stability and facilitating education.  
 
Boylan and Foley argue that political economy was used to maintain existing   
socio-economic relations in Ireland. Black argues that ‘at least up to the time of John 
Stuart Mill, the classical economists were agreed that no change in the system of 
landed property was necessary to the improvement of Ireland’ (1960:86). This might 
taken to imply that they considered other possibilities and rejected them. This was 
not the case. The political economists who participated in this debate worked within a 
system which was almost exclusively concerned with the distribution of output 
between landlord, capitalist and labourer. They did not consider alternatives for any 
country. To imply that the stance taken on the system of landed property was part of 
a plan to preserve only Irish socio-economic relations is to suggest a partisan 
agenda that simply did not exist.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
 I would like to acknowledge the useful comments of David Jacobson, Kathy Monks, Gary Murphy, 
and Eunan O'Halpin on earlier drafts of this paper. Errors remain my own. 
 
2
 Employment in public works did not fall into the category of outdoor relief. Thus, political economists 
who supported the removal of outdoor poor relief frequently also supported the extension of public 
works. Senior was a significant case in point. 
 
3
 These were in Belfast, Clonmel, Cork, Dublin, Ennis, Kilkenny, Limerick, Waterford and Wexford. 
 
4
 Stack points to the central role capital plays in Scrope’s ‘curious mixture of paternalism and political 
economy’ (2000, 558). Scrope’s arguments with respect to Ireland exemplifies his version of 
paternalism. Shades of Scrope’s paternalism are also evident in Bicheno (1831).  
 
5
 The concern with population growth in the annual reports of the Poor Law Commission was not a 
Malthusian fear of overpopulation. This is compatible with Blaug’s assertion that ‘the Mathusian theory 
of population underwent a total eclipse in the 1830s’ (Blaug 1958:44). 
 
6
 The practice of transportation of vagrants, as convicts, principally to America began in Ireland in 
1650s. Irish counties were permitted to raise rates to fund such transportation (Innes, 1999:188-190). 
   
7
 In fact, the majority of Irish emigrants headed for Australia and Canada rather than England 
(Fitzpatrick, 1984:5).   
 
8
 Senior’s stubbornness over the poor relief issue nearly cost him his long friendship with Richard 
Whately who, as head of the Royal Commission into the poor in Ireland, advocated extensive 
government intervention.  
 
9
 There was growing support for the Catholic cause in Ireland from many quarters throughout the early 
part of the nineteenth century. As Foster points out, ‘Irish Catholics had become dramatically better off 
than those in England,who were not enfranchised until 1829’ (1989:262). Foster also stresses that 
middle class Catholics had become members of the Irish Establishment, if only informally, by the 1820s 
(1989:296).  
 
 
10
 Support for the Catholic cause by political economists in Ireland is evidenced by the criticism of 
several of the Whately Professors of Political Economy at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1863, to the 
attempt by the Provost and his supporters on the Board of the college to remove eligibility of Catholics 
from the competition for the Professorship.  
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11
  The Commissioners were Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin and founder of the Whately 
Professorship of Political Economy at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1832, James Carlisle, John Corrie, 
Fenton Hort, Richard More O’Ferrall, Daniel Murray, Charles Vignoles and William Battie Wrightson. 
By the time the second report appeared, three more commissioners had been added: M. Killeen, 
A.R.Blake, and J. Bicheno.  
 
12
 The second report of the Commissioners did not appear in the Parliamentary Papers until after the 
publication of the third report. 
 
13
 Unemployment was defined by the Commission as being out of work for a period greater than 30 
weeks in a year. Cullen argues that the Commission ‘lumped together’ 567,000 smallholders with 
567,000 agricultural labourers, assuming both categories to be equally suscetible to destitution 
(1987:110).  
 
14
 A Commission was established in 1837 to consider the expansion of the railway in Ireland, but the 
significant developments in this regard only came in the late 1840s. 
 
15
 Localised schemes for emigration were developed periodically from the 1820s, such as the one which 
removed 2,300 destitute families from Munster to Canada (Fitzpatrick, 1984:18). Funds were supplied 
by individual landlords rather than by the State. The ‘brain drain’ argument in the context of Irish 
emigration only gathered momentum in the later decades of the century, with the development of ‘chain 
migration’ whereby future emigrants were selected and financed by previous emigrants (1984:21).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
